Segun Atanda/
Israel spent years infiltrating nearly every traffic camera in Tehran as part of a painstaking intelligence campaign that ultimately paved the way for the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, according to an investigation by the Financial Times.
The long-term surveillance effort formed a critical part of a broader, multi-agency intelligence drive involving Israel’s elite cyber and signals unit, Unit 8200, the foreign intelligence agency Mossad and, significantly, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency.
For years, images from Tehran’s traffic cameras were reportedly encrypted and transmitted to Israeli servers. The system allowed intelligence analysts to monitor movements around Pasteur Street, where Khamenei maintained offices and where members of his Vali Amr Protection Unit, an elite branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps tasked with his security, routinely operated.
One camera angle proved particularly revealing. It enabled analysts to observe where security personnel parked their personal vehicles and to build detailed behavioural profiles.
Advanced algorithms compiled what intelligence professionals call a “pattern of life” dossier, logging addresses, shift hours, commuting routes and which senior officials individual guards were assigned to protect.
A current Israeli intelligence official described the resulting surveillance architecture as so comprehensive that “we knew Tehran like we know Jerusalem”.
According to officials, even minor deviations in routine could be detected in real time.
The traffic camera operation was only one strand of a dense intelligence web.
Israeli capabilities allegedly extended to penetrating mobile phone infrastructure near Pasteur Street. At critical moments, components of nearby mobile towers could be selectively disrupted, causing phones to appear engaged and preventing protection teams from receiving warnings.
This layered approach ensured that when intelligence indicated Khamenei would attend a Saturday morning meeting at his compound, confirmation came from multiple independent streams.
Israeli military doctrine requires two senior officers, working separately, to verify with high certainty that a high-value target is present before authorising a strike.
In Khamenei’s case, signals intelligence provided one level of confirmation. According to individuals briefed on the operation, the CIA contributed something even more decisive: a human source with direct knowledge of the meeting schedule.
The CIA declined public comment, but sources said the human intelligence component gave additional assurance that Khamenei and senior officials would be present.
Israel’s targeting capacity has been shaped over decades. In 2001, then prime minister Ariel Sharon reportedly instructed Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, to make Iran the agency’s central focus. Since then, Israeli operations have included cyber sabotage, the assassination of nuclear scientists and systematic targeting of regional proxies.
Following the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel, a strategic shift occurred within Israeli security thinking. Analysts say longstanding reluctance to target top-tier political leaders began to erode, particularly amid assessments that Iran had backed hostile regional actors.
During the 12-day conflict in June 2025, Israel demonstrated extensive cyber and precision strike capabilities, disabling Iranian air defences and eliminating multiple high-ranking officials within minutes. Officials involved in planning the Khamenei strike concluded that waiting until open war escalated would likely drive Iranian leaders into hardened underground bunkers beyond the reach of available munitions.
Unlike Hassan Nasrallah, who spent years operating from concealed underground facilities before being killed in Beirut in 2024, Khamenei did not permanently reside in hiding. Although he maintained bunkers and occasionally used them during wartime, sources said he was not underground at the time of the strike.
The strike itself reportedly involved Israeli aircraft firing up to 30 precision-guided munitions after flying extended routes to ensure timing and positioning. Daylight conditions were chosen to maximise tactical surprise despite heightened Iranian alertness.
Officials familiar with the matter stressed that killing Khamenei was ultimately a political decision rather than a purely technological feat. The intelligence infrastructure, they said, merely ensured that once authorised, the operation would succeed.
Not all details of the operation are expected to become public. Intelligence agencies typically shield sources and methods that remain in use, particularly in an environment where Iranian counter-intelligence has also demonstrated sophisticated cyber capabilities.
Iran has previously conducted its own cyber operations, including attempts to access Israeli surveillance systems and gather sensitive data during wartime.
Former Mossad officials describe a culture in which intelligence targeting is central to strategy. One veteran observed that success breeds momentum, using a Hebrew expression meaning that appetite grows with what one consumes.
The campaign culminating in Khamenei’s assassination was not an overnight effort but the product of more than two decades of strategic focus, years of cyber penetration and months of final-stage operational refinement.
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